Middle East Studies, The Arab Spring & 1989

Every couple of months I receive a print copy of Foreign Affairs and I try to pick a piece out of each issue to explore further.  This time I want to visit the short essay by F. Gregory Cause III, professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, titled "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring".  Overall, I believe Cause makes valid claims as to why scholars of the Middle East failed to anticipate the overwhelming popular response known, now, as the Arab Spring.  His main point is that scholars questioned little of the seeming unwavering support for the regions undemocratic rulers, as the authoritarian regimes maintained power over the course of decades in the face of other democratic movements occurring in Africa and Europe, as well as the Iranian revolution and increasing secularization of Turkey.  Cause even cites his own mistaken belief of advocating support of the authoritarian regimes in a previous Foreign Affairs article, written in 2005, as he believed then that those rulers represented stability in a region that held vital importance to America's energy and foreign policy interests.  Now the recent upheavals and continuing conflicts in North Africa and the neighboring Middle East has thrown all previous assumptions and evaluations out the window.  Here is a quote from Cause:

Understanding what we missed and what we overestimated in our explanations of the stability of Arab authoritarianism -- and understanding why we did so -- is of more than just academic significance. Regional analysts must determine what changed in the forces that underpinned four decades of Arab regime stability and what new elements emerged to spark the current revolts. Doing so will allow U.S. policymakers to approach the Arab revolts more effectively by providing them insight into the factors that will drive postrevolutionary politics in the Arab world.

What immediately stuck me was the correlation between misconceptions of this event and the Eastern European separation from the Soviet Union in 1989- yet Cause does not make the link between the situation Middle Eastern scholars find themselves in today and the situation Soviet and East European scholars of yesterday faced when the Soviet Union dramatically collapsed in the span of two years.  It would be mistaken to say the two periods have perfect symmetry, but enough similarities exist to warrant examination.  Below, I want to consider the main points brought up by Cause and compare them with the experience of 1989 in Eastern Europe.  My goal is not to simply draw one-to-one correlations between the Arab Spring and 1989 (the two events are unique phenomena and products of their time), but rather to show how the movements were both alike and differentiated.  As a sort of caveat emptor, I should state up front that the following is an exploration engaging in generalizations that could all be brought under closer scrutiny in order to detect both the complexity and texture broad narrative attempts, like this, often conceal.

Let's begin with Cause identifying "what academia knew and did not know."  His first point deals with Middle East scholars inability to tie the regions assessed stability to the culture of the states examined.  While avoiding old tropes regarding Islam's supposed incompatibility with democracy, a welcome change from previous academic stances, scholars downplayed the role of Arab culture, as it was understood, because of the belief that authoritarian regimes possessed the political acumen to co-opt and contain expressions of dissent.  Even though evidence surfaced, from time to time, that Arab people were less than satisfied with their governing situation, many scholars failed to see the warning signs due to their belief in two pillars of authoritarian rule- "the military-security complex and state control over the economy."

Similar claims were made by pundits and scholars concerning the durability of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe in the pre-1989 era.  Their belief, too, was based on assumptions regarding the Soviet Union's predilection towards military invasions to prop up Communist party rule and the supposed power the command economy gave in quelling sources of discontent.  As the Western economies faced recession or very slow growth through much of the 70's, due largely to a sharp spike in OPEC pricing, the Eastern Bloc nations posted positive economic growth.  These assumptions, like the ones held by Middle East scholars above, were not without some merit.  Various Eastern European nations/movements engaged in outright revolt against Soviet power in the decades previous to 1989 and all were crushed or effectively silenced, at least (and perhaps only) in the eyes of the West.

We now know, through hindsight, that several sources of dissent and discontent were bubbling beneath the surface of Soviet society, particularly in Eastern Europe- although few Western observers at the time saw in these movements the potential to bring down the entire superstructure of Soviet rule.  Any outright attempt to oust the Communist party leadership resulted in military or security crackdowns, hence the movement in the late 70's and 80's towards building a separate 'civil society' that espoused a clear 'anti-politics' stance with regards to the ruling authorities.  This idea was perhaps best expressed by Vaclav Havel and his influential essay, 'Power of the Powerless'.  It was also the central theme of the 'Solidarity' movement- the goal in those movements and several others was not to challenge the Party directly, but to instead build towards a establishing a new space, outside of Soviet totalitarian control, where one could address the issues of day to day life.

The various movements against Soviet rule are highlighted wonderfully in Padraic Kenney's book, Carnival of Revolution.  One particular example, detailed by Kenney, was the 'Orange Alternative' in Poland that used street theatre and other tactics to bring absurdity to the agents of absolutist control.  In one of their most striking actions, the group put the word out for sympathetic youths to gather at a prescribed time in the city of Wroclaw and don red caps to become 'elves' for the holiday known as 'Children's Day'. (1 July)  These 'elves' went around sharing candy and singing children's songs, attempting to show in a non-threatening way that both the 'elves' and regular people could come together as a group and not be afraid.  Even as security agents arrested and hauled away various 'elves', the red-capped youth would shower their captors with kisses, continue to throw candy to the crowd and wave exuberantly from the confines of the police wagons.  Because this group pursued actions that looked and felt absurd, the use of overwhelming power to silence the various 'events' the Orange Alternative conducted was also shown to be absurd.  What does it say about a totalitarian state's hold on power if it worries about, and actively attempts to quell, the singing and candy-throwing merriment of a bunch of 'elves'?

The larger lesson to take away is that when people are stifled in state-dominated structures, be that in economic or cultural terms, they will create spaces outside and separate from officialy sanctioned relationships to build towards achieving the ideal they feel is currently denied.  David Ost, in his book Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics, states that one of the goals of the 'Anti-Political' movement was,

Belief that what is essential to a just order is not a benign government and good people in power, but rather a vital, active, aware, self-governing and creative society.  

Now, as I stated above, the events and actions of 1989 do not neatly correlate with the Arab Spring of 2011.  Indeed, one key difference highlighted by Cause in his article, with regards to the exercise of military force to keep authoritarian regimes in power, was that nations in which the bulk composition of the army matched the religious denomination of the people peacefully protesting (in Muslim religious belief there are two major denominations- the Shia and the Sunni) there tended to be less desire to use violence in quelling the movements.  This is why, Cause states, the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries largely refrained from using force to prop up the obviously unpopular Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes.  (He also adds that professionalism and detachment from the direct command of the authoritarian regime also played key roles- in effect, the Army possessed more room to maneuver, outside the whims of the ruling regimes, in delicate situations)  In other nations, where the military officers and rulers are of the same minority religious affiliation, such as Bahrain and Jordan, there is more outward support of the ruling regimes and willingness to utilize violence to demonstrate that support.  In places like Libya, where the institutionalization of the military has been defunct or intentionally handicapped, allegiance falls along fuzzy lines more suited to the calculus of hegemony than religious belief.  

Religion certainly played a role in the build-up and sustainment of the tumultuous events of 1989, but conflict between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the ruling Soviet authorities was, generally, not couched in terms of religious identity.  Of course, institutions like the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox church played important roles and gave their supporters a concrete identity to fix their complaints against Soviet rule upon- Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland in 1979 being the most widely recognized example.  Yet, for many, the conflict over Soviet control touched on more than just religious issues- it encompassed all aspects of life.  I suspect that as the Arab Spring is brought under increased scrutiny by scholars and laypeople alike, there will be a more nuanced understanding of the complex identity issues at play between demonstrators and the agents of the regime.

Another contradiction missed by scholars and highlighted by Cause was the enduring consequences of taking on 'Western' modernization policies for authoritarian regimes in non-oil producing states.  Here is a quote:

Many Middle East scholars recognized that the neoliberal economic programs were causing political problems for Arab governments, but few foresaw their regime-shaking consequences. Academics overestimated both the ameliorating effect of the economic growth introduced by the reforms and the political clout of those who were benefiting from such policies. As a result, they underestimated the popular revulsion to the corruption and crony privatization that accompanied the reforms.

For the nations of the Eastern Bloc pursuit of more liberal 'western' economic policies was taboo, evidenced by the wholesale rejection of 'different paths to Socialism' by Soviet authorities.  Western money flows funneled during the detente period of the 70's into Eastern Europe were spent on ill-thought out projects or improvements designed only to enhance the life of the apparatchiks.  While this would seem, on face, to be an almost reverse 'mirror-image' from the Arab Spring experience, looking closer one can detect the same underlying cause for angst in both examples; economic benefits that were supposed to be  distributed among society were, instead, remaining pooled at the top ranks of the bureaucracy and its favored clients.  As Cause noted, those Arab states with large reserves of oil revenues were able to 'buy off' the anger of their people by periodically infusing large amounts of cash into programs and projects meant to shore up support for the 'social contract' held between ruler and ruled.  In less endowed Arab states, the resentment over the pace and distribution of economic benefits conferred by the increasing acceptance, at top policy levels, of western liberal economic ideas led to widespread dissatisfaction.

In the 70's and 80's, Soviet subsidies of oil and natural gas literally fueled the Eastern Bloc's economic growth, although this policy, meant to cull support for the larger Soviet system, ended up shielding them from the more disruptive effects then wrecking havoc on much of the Western economic world. (Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries do note some alternative interpretations of the Soviet economic relationship to the Eastern Bloc nations in their excellent survey work, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change.  The alternate viewpoints hinge on a more narrowly focused economic view of the 'subsidies' relationship, noting that amounts given both ways do not necessarily correlate to hegemonic considerations)  While the various nations in the Eastern Bloc continued on their 'incentivized' path towards increased production in heavy industry, they did so at the expense of commercial goods production.  Combined with a deceasing ability to export to the West (inferiority of goods and a sharp decline in demand through the 70's and early 80's, not to mention extremely corrupt and inefficient export controls), the result was stagnating growth rates that increasingly proved incapable of coping with the inflationary pressure thereto hidden from the economy.  When the various nations moved to introduce measures intended to correct the asymmetry, such as raising the price of heating oil or foodstuffs, often the people expressed extreme dissatisfaction by engaging in protests or full-scale revolts.  Once Gorbachev made it known that the Soviet Army would not 'step in' to bolster the support of the Communist party in economically beleaguered satellite nations, the crises of leadership only exacerbated at the top levels throughout much of Eastern Europe.     

The final point Cause makes in his essay is how the force of pan-Arabism was also misunderstood by Middle East scholars:

"...many of us assumed that the cross-border appeal of Arab identity had waned in recent years, especially following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. Egypt and Jordan had signed treaties with Israel, and the Palestinians and Syria had engaged in direct negotiations with Israel, breaking a cardinal taboo of pan- Arabism. U.S.-led wars against Iraq in 1990-91 and beginning in 2003 excited opposition in the Arab world but did not destabilize the governments that cooperated with the U.S. military plans -- a sign of waning pan-Arabism as much as government immunity to popular sentiment. It seemed that Arab states had become strong enough (with some exceptions, such as Lebanon and post-Saddam Hussein Iraq) to fend off ideological pressures from across their borders. Most Middle East scholars believed that pan-Arabism had gone dormant."

But it hadn't.  Part of the misconception stemmed from the belief that pan-Arabism was synonymous to the motivations and plans expressed by Nasser in the 1950's, that being the reshaping of the Arab geo-political landscape into one super-Arab nation.  Scholars believed that such a movement had lost significant steam, in part due to the reasons explained above.  Yet the Arab Spring demonstrated that, in some instances, a collective sense of identity does exist among Arabs across the Middle East.  Cause says that future U.S. policy makers will not be able to look at Arab nations on a case-by-case basis without first considering the effects shared identity present- case in point, it will be more difficult now to explain support for the Egyptian Revolts while accepting Bahraini crackdowns on democracy protests.

Here is where the experiences of the Arab Spring and 1989 sharply diverge.  The Eastern European nation-states of the 'Warsaw Pact' shared very little in the way of collective history or culture.  While it is true that 1989 contained a sort of 'domino effect', in that the ease of travel restrictions in Hungary led to relaxed mesures in East Germany and the eventual teardown of the Berlin Wall, etc... this was more in response to the loosening (and then outright collapse) of Soviet control and less to the 'culturally shared tradition' of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.  Of course, people were inspired by the actions taken in other Soviet satellite states- but my larger point is that the 'cultural' force, if you can call it that, behind the events of 1989 was the casting off of Soviet/Communistic identities and influence in favor of a regeneration of the distinct, and for some historic, sense of the self and the local free from outside control.  Michael Bernhard explains in his book, The Origins of Democratization in Poland, that the nations of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany all pursued different paths towards democratization during the 70's and 80's.  Communist reformers actually helped pave the way in Hungary, with the key factor there being a re-evaluation of the events of 1956.  East Germany, while having few disturbances, constantly received influence from West Germany, whose rapid economic expansion put the more depressed East in stark contrast.  Czechoslovakia possessed a vibrant dissident movement, exemplified by Charter 77, yet ultimately the incredible groundswell of support in the form of mass protests paved the way towards a new conception of the 'civil society'.  Poland, perhaps the most restive of Soviet satellites, is best known for its 'Solidarity' movement, represented to the West by the figure of Lech Walesa, and their critique of Communist rule often came in the form of workers strikes.  These explanations are just cursory differentiations of movements that were equally diverse and complex, but the main point is that, save for a discreet notion of 'European' identity, the now independent nation-states of Eastern Europe did not (and still don't) share the same kind of broad, homogenizing ideal like that expressed in the term pan-Arabism.

Clearly the two events shared more than just a revolutionary spirit, but there are also points of divergence.  The impacts of 1989 are still being felt across Eastern Europe, just as the implications and changes brought about the recent Arab Spring and ongoing revolts across the Middle East will be felt for decades to come.  Cause concedes at the end of his essay the limited power policy makers and scholars alike must come to terms with when dealing with a region as diverse and complex as the Middle East.  The same could have been said for Eastern Europe in the 1990's- yet the regions central role underpinning geo-political relationships between the East and the West guaranteed that its fate would not be left to chance.  I suspect the same is true for the Middle East, as the region combines both security and energy interests greatly pursued by the United States and much of the West.  The question now is whether or not new assumptions made from the early results of the Arab Spring will produce additional flawed insight and policy planning, like that analyzed by Cause above, or if it will inspire bouts of wisdom backed by humility.